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Abstract
Wars are increasingly frequent, and the trend has been steadily upward since 1870.
The main tradition of Western political and philosophical thought suggests that
extensive economic globalization and democratization over this period should have
reduced appetites for war far below their current level. This view is clearly
incomplete: at best, confounding factors are at work. Trade and democracy are
traditionally thought of as goods, both in themselves, and because they reduce the
willingness to go to war, conditional on the national capacity to do so. The same
factors may also have been increasing the capacity to wage war, and so its
frequency. We need better understanding of how to promote these goods without
incurring adverse side-effects on world peace.
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The Frequency of Wars
Wars are becoming more frequent. More precisely, the frequency of militarized
conflicts among independent states has been rising steadily over 130 years. In this
paper I suggest some reasons for this.
Part 1 of the paper reviews the data, and finds the trend to be of concern. Part 2
outlines some reasons why the trend is puzzling as well as worrying. The puzzle is
that the world has become more globalized and more democratic; on both counts it
should have got more peaceful, not less. In Part 3, I raise some issues about how the
factors conducive to peace and war have been analyzed in the recent literature; in
particular, underlying determinants of national capacity for war merit closer
attention. Fiscal and commercial aspects of the capacity for war are defined in Parts
4 and 5; the issue here is that these capacities are promoted by the same forces of
democratization and globalization that are supposed to discourage conflict. Part 6
concludes, suggesting lines of further investigation.1. How Frequent?
Figure 1 charts the number of pairs of countries that have disputed with each other
in each year from 1870 to 2001. This is a greater number than the number of wars
for two reasons: first, it accounts for the number of countries involved in each
conflict, rather than the number of conflicts; second, it has wider coverage than
formal states of war, including displays as well as uses of military force. The chart
measures the number of pairwise disputes on a logarithmic scale, partly to give a
clear picture of what has happened at the lower frequencies.
Chart 1. Militarized disputes between pairs of countries since 1870
Source: Data from Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008).
Viewed in this way, the chart demonstrates the existence of a clear log-linear
trend; the frequency of bilateral conflicts has been rising for over a century at a
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2steady 2¼ percent per year.1 To be sure, there was a good deal of disturbance in the
period of the two world wars. But the surprising character of this disturbance is as
follows: between 1914 and 1945, the conflicts that would normally have been
distributed across the three decades were either brought forward (to World War I)
or postponed (to World War II). After 1945, the frequency of conflict snapped back
to the trend it had followed up to 1914.
In principle, the absolute number of pairwise conflicts per time period, or the
absolute frequency, is the product of two underlying variables into which it can
therefore be decomposed. One component is the number of country pairs, which
has increased enormously since the nineteenth century. In 1870 the world contained
fewer than 50 independent states. By the end of the twentieth century, there were
more than 180. This was associated with the breakup of empires (Austro-Hungarian,
German, Ottoman, Russian, French, British, Dutch, Belgian, Portuguese, and Soviet)
and federations (Czechoslovak and Yugoslav). As a result the total number of
possible country pairs in the world between whom relations of peace or war could
exist grew from around one thousand to over 17,000.
After the increase in the number of possible pairs is stripped out of the data, we
are left with the other component, the relative frequency of conflicts, that is, the
absolute frequency of pairwise conflict normalized for the number of pairs. The
number of countries since 1870 and the relative frequency of conflicts among them
are shown together in Chart 2. As the chart shows, in the first 80 years the number
of countries did not change much, but the relative frequency of disputes tended to
rise. Then, over the next 40 or so years things changed; the relative frequency of
disputes fell back to the level of the 1870s, but the number of countries increased
dramatically, and it was this that took over as the main driver of the continued rise
in the absolute frequency of conflicts.
This gives us two possible angles on what has been going on. Normalized for the
number of country pairs, the relative frequency of war does not show a trend and is
no higher today than in the 1870s. This might seem to reassure, but should not do
so. For, normalized for the number of planets that all countries must share – given
as one, exactly – the absolute frequency of conflict today is similar to what it was
during World War I. (The intensity of conflict is much lower, of course; it is simply
the number of pairwise conflicts that is the same.) It is true that the number of
conflicts has been driven up since 1945 by the number of states. But the number of
states is not an exogenous or random variable. When new states come into being,
1 Statistical tests (not reported here) indicate that the data are described better
as a first-order autoregressive process than a random walk. A rising trend is not
evident in some other possible measures of the frequency of conflict, for example
the absolute number of wars in each year (Poast 2006, p. 129). On my calculation
the number of military fatalities in wars in each year since 1820 has risen on a trend
similar to that of the world’s population (whereas the upward trend in the frequency
of bilateral disputes has risen faster by a full percentage point). One could infer that,
while pairwise conflicts are becoming more frequent, they are not becoming more
important. Whether that risks complacency is a matter for judgement.
3what motivates them is the demand for sovereignty (Alesina and Spolaore 2003).
And sovereignty includes decisions over peace – and war – with neighbors, including
former compatriots. In fact it is not at all uncommon for new states to plunge into
war, like Serbia, or be born out of war, like Kosovo.
Chart 2. The relative frequency of pairwise militarized disputes and the number of
independent states since 1870
Source: Data from Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008).
In sum, should we be reassured by the lack of trend in the relative frequency of
conflict, or alarmed by the rising trend in absolute numbers? In my view the trend in
the absolute frequency should arouse our concern. It is also a puzzle.2. Too Frequent?
The data are a surprise, given the longstanding traditions of western political and
philosophical thinking on the future of war. According to these traditions, the global
trends towards democracy and globalization should make war increasingly a
minority sport. In fact, war is a minority sport. The problem is that the minority is
growing, and this should not be happening.
The expected relationship between war and globalization is, on the face of it,
clear cut. For many reasons, modern states ought to prefer trade to war. On the eve
of World War I, Norman Angell (1910, pp. 76-77) wrote:
Men are fundamentally just as disposed as they were at any time to take wealth
that does not belong to them. But their relative interest in the matter has
changed. In very primitive conditions robbery is a moderately profitable
enterprise ... But to the man whose wealth so largely depends upon his credit,
dishonesty has become as precarious and profitless as honest toil was in more
primitive times.
In more contemporary terms, trade is a positive-sum interaction; war is
negative-sum. Trade costs have fallen (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy 2008); war costs
are high and rising (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008; Glick and Taylor forthcoming). Victory in
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4war can bring one-sided gains but the gains are reversible if conflict is renewed. And,
in wars of choice, victory is not only uncertain but unlikely. On the record of all wars
since 1700, to start one attracts a 60 percent probability of defeat (Eckhardt 1989).
More or less the same tradition affirms that the spread of democracy should
crowd war out of the global community. It is widely held that “Liberal or democratic
states do not fight each other” (Levy 1988). The reasons for it have been debated. It
is not hard to identify democratic political structures that impose restraint on
leaders; leaders that lose wars, for example, are found to be more likely to lose
office in democracies than in autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).
Plausibly, democratic norms also make leaders more likely to exercise self-restraint.
Autocrats, in contrast, can steal the benefits of war while shifting the costs onto
their subjects (Jackson and Morelli 2007); if defeated, they can retain supporters’
loyalty at lower cost than in a democracy (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).
A compelling illustration of the so-called democratic peace is shown in Table 1.
Whether the definition of conflict is narrow or broad, democracies have been
systematically less likely to engage in it with each other.
Table 1. Russett on dispute behavior, 1946-1986
War No war Percent with war
Democracy 0 169 0.0
Not Democracy 37 1045 3.4
Use of force No use of force Percent using force
Democracy 8 161 4.7
Not Democracy 229 853 21.2
Any dispute No dispute Percent with dispute
Democracy 12 157 7.1
Not Democracy 257 825 23.8
Note: The unit of analysis is the “regime-dyad.” The unit is counted as a democracy
in all years when both countries in the dyad (or pair) are democratic, and not
otherwise. All years in which the regime of the dyad is unchanged are taken as a
single unit, so as to eliminate any bias arising from persistent pairwise behavior.
Source: Russett (1995, p. 167).
The recent literature on the democratic peace is not unequivocal in support of
it, however. Here are three recent qualifications. Downs and Rocke (1994) have
noted that elected leaders that face punishment by the electorate because their
policies are failing have an incentive to gamble for resurrection, either by starting
wars or by persisting with them, in the hope that something will turn up. This
argument has been applied to Iraq by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008), as well as
generalized by Majumdar and Mukand (2004). Observing the record of the former
Soviet and Yugoslav states Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 2002) have proposed that
new or incompletely established democracies are particularly vulnerable to risky
adventures in nation-building. Georgia seems to have supplied recent out-of-sample
confirmation. Finally Conconi, Sahuguet, and Zanardi (2008) have found in the data
that democracies where leaders are subject to term limits are as likely to make war
as autocratic states – and term limits are increasingly widespread. It is the
5democracies without term limits, where established leaders retain the option of
continuing to compete for office, that account for the democratic peace.
In short, the idea that democratization necessarily spreads peace has been
qualified in various ways. Whether taken separately or together, however, the
qualifications do not seem fully up to the task of explaining a trend towards the
rising frequency of war that has persisted for 130 years. The full difficulty that we
face is illustrated in Charts 3 and 4 which deal, respectively, with the spread of
democracy and trade.
Chart 3. Democratization and militarized disputes since 1870
Source: Data from Marshall and Jaggers (2007); Martin , Mayer, and Thoenig (2008).
Chart 4. Trade openness and militarized disputes since 1870
Source: Data from Martin , Mayer, and Thoenig (2008).
As these charts illustrate, the general tendency has been for trade and
democratization to grow together. From study of the endogenous relationship
between trade and democratization since 1870, López Córdova and Meissner (2008)
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6confirm that more open countries have been consistently more democratic; most
likely trade has tended to drive democracy but with long lags and through uncertain
and varying channels. But on our own figures, as trade and democracy have spread,
so have wars. Over significant sub-periods, for example from 1870 to 1913 and from
the mid-1970s to 2001, the positive associations of openness and democratization
with the absolute frequency of wars have been particularly close. Thus, if we have
not got the general relationship between economic and political progress and war
completely and utterly wrong, then, to say the least, we have missed some
important confounding factors.3. How Much Do We Really Know?
We know less than we should, apparently. There is a vast and long-standing
international relations literature on war and peace. The literature was once based
on intuitive inference from narratives and comparisons, but has been transformed
over the last thirty years by new data and the application of quantitative methods.
Large-scale open-access cross-country panel datasets have been created that deal
with war and peace, political regimes, and historical macroeconomic and trade
variables.2 We should know more than ever before about the correlates of war and
peace. Yet, what do we know?
As might be expected, the literature that has resulted, being voluminous, is of
variable quality. Not all of the data now available have been well used; among
thousands of regressions that have been reported are many with potentially biased
or otherwise dubious estimates, for example because of the neglect of fixed effects
in pooled regressions (Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001).
In some ways the present state of the field is reminiscent of the literature on
global economic growth and divergence a decade or more ago. Banerjee (2007) has
described how economists strayed into thinking of global development as a machine
that produced growth using levers labeled “investment,” “education,” and “trade.”
In much the same way, estimation strategies now typically model global relations as
a machine with big push-buttons marked “democracy” and “trade.” Economists
have learned, however, that, while the big buttons have some power as statistical
drivers of global development in the aggregate, their power has intrinsic limits. The
buttons become particularly unreliable when applied in the context of any given
country. One likely reason (Rodrik 2007) is that their operation is likely to be at least
partly confounded by unobserved cross-country variation in institutions.
Where next for the study of peace and war? Experience suggests three possible
correctives. One is to look inside the regressors: democracy and trade are complex
phenomena that may have multiple or non-linear effects. An example of work in this
spirit would be the investigation of term limits in democracies cited previously, but
other aspects are also likely to be deserving of closer study. Collier (2007) has
2 See the Correlates of War project at http://www.correlatesofwar.org, the
Polity IV project at http://www.systemicpeace.org, the Penn World Tables at
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu, and the work of Angus Maddison at
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison.
7argued that electoral competition may impede effective governance for
development unless accompanied by checks on executive power. Intuitively,
electoral competition without executive restraint might be as damaging for
international relations as it can be for domestic development.
Another desirable corrective is to demand that cross-section results ought to be
reconciled with what time series and narratives tell us. The virtue of cross sections is
that they enlarge the data; but the fact is that we live our lives through time. When
we ask what may happen next year, it is not always helpful to be told what would
happen if Argentina became Britain in a timeless way, since countries (and country
pairs) are likely to be otherwise different in ways that we cannot control. Narratives
of democratization in particular countries, for example, have shed light on the
hypothesis of democratic peace where pooled cross-section studies have failed to
do so or may even have misled. In principle fixed effects should exclude the across-
unit variation from the variation that is exploited for estimation, leaving only the
within-unit variation over time, but it is not always clear what is the unit: the
country or the pair, for example (or even the “regime-pair,” as in Table 1). Under
these circumstances, narratives should provide a further check on robustness.
Finally, a focus on the appetite or “demand” for war is reasonable and
justifiable, but may have led us to neglect “supply-side” or capacity-for-war factors
that are also relevant. The nature of “state and legal capacity” generally, and its
relationship to propensities for peace and war, are the subject of recent work by
Besley and Persson (2008 and forthcoming). I will consider aspects of this at greater
length, using two examples: the fiscal capacity for war and what I will term the
“commercial” capacity for war. Globalization and democratization both ought to
have diminished the appetite for war – and may well do so in cross section. But they
may also have promoted the capacity for war over long periods, and this may
explain some of what we see in the historical time series.4. The Fiscal Capacity for War
In the middle ages citizens were poor. Tax compliance was low and sovereign debt
was unattractive to lenders. Often, rulers raised military forces in kind: local
overlords supplied the king with armed men and food. As a result, the ruler could
wage external war only by consensus. Or the king raised taxes to pay the army;
conditional on having done so, he gained freedom of military action, but he could
raise the taxes in the first place only through the overlords, and this again required
their consent. Nor could rulers borrow to any great extent because, at this stage,
there was no real distinction between public finance and the personal finance of the
king; lenders were reluctant, not knowing if the king would be bound by his word, or
if his debts would die with him.
Comparative historical research of Karaman and Pamuk (2008) on the Ottoman
Empire, reported in Table 2, is suggestive that no sixteenth-century ruler could
extract more than 2 or 3 per cent of GNP in central revenues from the territory of
the kingdom. The burden on peasants might well be higher, but much of what could
be levied was dissipated locally in paying off overlords or tax farmers. Only adding to
8the size of the kingdom could add to central revenues, but this risked diminishing
returns to the delegation of tax-raising authority across a larger territory.
The seventeenth century saw a fiscal revolution in northwestern Europe.
Afterwards, English and Dutch fiscal ratios climbed to 10 and then 20 percent of
national income. Chart 5 portrays the progress of this revolution in England between
1500 and 1800. In the middle of these three centuries fall the English Civil War of
1642 to 1651 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Before 1642 English revenues
were only once, briefly, more than 5 per cent of national income; after 1688, they
were never less than that, and increasingly much more.
Table 2. Central tax revenues, per head (number of daily wages of unskilled
construction workers in the capital city)
1550/59 1780/89
Holland/Dutch republic 5 19
Spain 4 18
England 3 17
Austria ... 14
France 3 12
Ottoman Empire 2 to 4 2 to 3
Note: I have omitted figures for Venice from the table (9 in 1550/59 and 13 in
1780/89). Venice was a special case: a city state, the Singapore of early modern
Europe, a pioneer of commerce and public finance, but not a contender for military
hegemony in a world increasingly dominated by nations.
Source: Karaman and Pamuk (2008).
Chart 5. English revenues, 1500 to 1800 (per cent of conjectured national income)
Source: O’Brien (2005).
What drove the transformation of public finance? The Civil War and the Glorious
Revolution destroyed absolutism and set new restraints on the executive – at least,
the executive was now restrained in everything but the making of war (Açemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson 2005). Abroad, the government aggressively promoted the
9Atlantic trade by extending naval power, a policy that won taxpayers’ support and
built tax compliance. At home, credible guarantees against default widened the
market for sovereign debt. The result was to build public finance (Tilly 1990,
Ferguson 2001, O’Brien 2005).
Since other regions of Europe and the Near East did not follow, there was fiscal
divergence. As Table 2 showed, at the end of the eighteenth century the fiscal ratio
of the Ottoman Empire remained where it had been. Through the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the fiscal gap widened. In fact, by the era of the two world
wars, the liberal democracies could put half or more of national income into both
world wars. In World War I, Germany exhausted its economy in the attempt to
compete; the agrarian empires of the Ottomans, Romanovs, and Habsburgs
struggled to mobilize their resources at all (Broadberry and Harrison 2005).
Table 3. Public spending in two world wars (per cent of national income in peak year)
Government
outlays,
1914 to 1918
Military
outlays,
1939 to 1945
USA *17 42
UK 37 55
France 54 ...
Germany 59 70
Japan ** 70
Russia/USSR *** 61
Note: * The United States was in World War I for a year and a half compared with
more than four years for the UK, France, and Germany. ** Japan was not in World
War I. *** There are no data for Russia at this time.
Source: Harrison (1998), Broadberry and Harrison (2005).
Later in the century, the non-democracies caught up and narrowed or even
eliminated the gap. The extraordinary fiscal ratios of Nazi Germany, militarist Japan,
and the Soviet Union stand out in Table 3. Behind this lay the fact that, by World
War II, dictators of varying hues had learned to exploit modern repression to match
the fiscal capacities of the capitalist democracies (Harrison 1998). What the dictators
could not do, however, was match their commercial capacities for war.5. The Commercial Capacity for War
The commercial capacity for war is illustrated by a twentieth-century paradox. Since
the Napoleonic era, European governments have worried about food security.
Britain has relied overwhelmingly on imported calories. Despite this, in two world
wars Britain had little difficulty in feeding its people (Olson 1963). In contrast, those
countries that believed themselves secure were the first to run short of food. In the
last quarter of the nineteenth century its leaders worked hard to limit Germany’s
exposure to international trade and to protect agriculture. In 1914 Russia went to
war congratulating itself on the availability of a large peacetime surplus of
exportable food. Yet it was Russian and German cities that were stalked by hunger
(Offer 1989; Broadberry and Harrison 2005).
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It was easier for Britain to feed itself from the other side of the world than for
Berlin, Vienna, St Petersburg, or Constantinople to induce farmers thirty miles
distant from the capital to feed their own people. Why was this? Britain had
invested not in agriculture but in something more important: the gains from
international trade. These were not only direct gains in the Ricardian sense of
returns to specialization, but also indirect gains from the establishment of an
overseas trading network that would robustly survive the disruptions of continental
war. The Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires had inferior
external networks, although Russia was helped by peripheral membership of the
Anglo-French network. But there was more: these countries, with their large
peasant populations, could not maintain the integration of their own domestic
markets under the pressure of wartime mobilization. Unable to trade with the cities
on peacetime terms, their peasant farmers seceded from the war effort, retreating
into subsistence activities, leaving the soldiers and war workers without food.
To varying degrees, these countries had a commercial capacity for war that was
greatly inferior to Britain’s. They thought they were safe; they perceived the British
to be at risk. When war broke out, they expected Britain to starve. Using commerce
rather than agriculture, however, the British fed themselves to standards little short
of peacetime through two world wars. In both world wars, moreover, the Allies were
able to multiply the military value of coalition resources through long-distance
economic cooperation that the Central and Axis Powers could not match.
The lesson of this narrative is straightforward: war and trade are not exclusive.
The same conclusion can be reached in other ways, however. Using panel data from
1950, Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) have shown that trade had a double effect
on the relative frequency of pairwise conflict. More bilateral trade reduced this
frequency, but more multilateral trade raised it. Over time both multilateral and
bilateral openness increased on average, but the net effect was positive. For any
country pair separated by less than 1,000 kilometers, globalization from 1970 to
2000 raised the probability of conflict by one fifth (from 3.7 to 4.5 percent). On the
interpretation of Martin and his co-authors, the same forces that widened the scope
of multilateral trade made bilateral war less costly. As long-distance trade costs fell,
open economies could increasingly wage war against some (most likely close by),
while continuing to reap the gains from trade with others (at a distance).
From various angles, therefore, it is possible to identify something that it is
convenient to call the commercial capacity for war; this capacity is increasing in
trade liberalization, and also in the information, communication, transportation, and
transaction technologies that account for much of modern economic growth.6. Conclusions
The evidence suggests that, normalized by the number of countries (or people) in
the world, the risk of war is no higher today than in the 1870s. Normalized by the
number of planets we have to share, however, it is of the same frequency (if not
intensity) as during World War I. There has been a steady upward trend in the
number of bilateral conflicts over 130 years – and this should arouse our concern.
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The rising trend may turn out to be driven by things we would otherwise
welcome as global improvements. For example, the hunger for self-determination
has been satisfied in many troubled regions, leading to the formation of new states
– each providing a new focus for potential conflict. Democracy is becoming more
typical – and, with democracy comes improved fiscal capacity; as a result, countries
that adopt democracy are likely to be able to raise taxes or borrow more in order to
promote national adventures without recourse to domestic repression.
Falling trade costs are another modern boon that has allowed many countries to
benefit from specialization and increased economic interdependence. Wider
markets have also increased the scope for smaller countries to self-insure against
asymmetric shocks. A moral hazard that we associate with insurance, however, is
that the insured can then engage in risky behavior at lower cost. In the same way,
small states that reduce risks through multilateral exchange may become more
inclined to risky action in bilateral relations.
We could stop here, noting that the news is mixed-to-bad; by implication, there
is nothing much to be done except build defenses against an increasingly dangerous
world. This seems to me to be unduly pessimistic. But more positive action must
await answers to two questions.
Democracy is good, but without nation there is no democracy, and nation-
building is a double-edged process. Similarly, falling trade costs and wider
multilateral exchange are powerful promoters of economic growth and
development, but may also cheapen war. How can we encourage democracy to
spread in ways that don’t offer gains to nation-building adventurists? How can we
lock countries into regional or global trade without freeing their hands for
confrontational foreign adventures? Together, these questions may hold one of the
keys to a peaceful twenty-first century.
12
References
Açemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2005. The Rise of Europe:
Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth. American Economic
Review 95:3, 546–79.
Alesina, Alberto, and Enrico Spolaore. 2003. The Size of Nations. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Angell, Norman. 1910. The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to
National Advantage. London : Heinemann.
Banerjee, Abhijit. 2007. Inside the Machine: Toward a New Development Economics.
Boston Review 32:2, pp. 12-18.
Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2008. Wars and State Capacity. Journal of the
European Economic Association 6:2-3, pp. 522-530.
Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. Forthcoming. The Origins of State Capacity:
Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics. American Economic Review.
Broadberry, Stephen G., and Mark Harrison, eds. 2005. The Economics of World War
I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. War and the Survival of
Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political
Accountability. American Political Science Review 89:4, pp. 841-855.
Collier, Paul. 2007. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and
What Can Be Done About It. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conconi, Paola, Nicolas Sahuguet, and Maurizio Zanardi. 2008. Democratic Peace
and Electoral Accountability. Working Paper. ECARES, Université Libre de
Bruxelles.
Downs, George W., and David M. Rocke. 1994. Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for
Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War. American Journal of
Political Science 38:2, pp. 362-380.
Eckhardt, William. 1989. Civilian Deaths in Wartime. Bulletin of Peace Proposals
20:1, pp. 89-98.
Fergson, Niall. 2001. The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-
2000. London: Allen Lane.
Glick, Reuven, and Alan M. Taylor. Forthcoming. Collateral Damage: Trade
Disruption and the Economic Impact of War. Review of Economics and Statistics.
Green, Donald P., Soo Yeon Kim, and David H. Yoon. 2001. Dirty Pool. International
Organization 55:2, pp. 441-468.
Harrison, Mark, ed. 1998. The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in
International Comparison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jacks, David S., Christopher M. Meissner, and Dennis Novy. 2008. Trade Costs, 1870-
2000. American Economic Review 98:2, pp. 529-534.
Jackson, Matthew O., and Massimo Morelli. 2007. Political Bias and War. American
Economic Review 97:4, pp. 1353-1373.
Karaman, Kivanç, and Şevket Pamuk. 2008. Ottoman State Finances and Fiscal
Institutions in European Perspective, 1500-1914. Paper to the Workshop on
States and Long-Term Economic Growth, London School of Economics.
Levy, Jack S. 1988. Domestic Politics and War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History
18:4, pp. 653-673.
López Córdova, J. Ernesto, and Chris Meissner. 2008. The Globalization of Trade and
Democracy. World Politics 60:4, pp. 539-575.
Majumdar, Sumon, and Sharun W. Mukand, 2004. Policy Gambles. American
Economic Review 94:4, pp. 1207-1222.
13
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 1995. Democratization and War. Foreign
Affairs 74:3, pp. 79-97.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 2002. Democratic Transitions, Institutional
Strength, and War. International Organization 56.2, pp. 297-337.
Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2007. Political Regime Characteristics and
Transitions, 1800-2006. Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV Project at
http://www.systemicpeace.org.
Martin, Philippe, Thierry Mayer, and Mathias Thoenig. 2008. Make Trade Not War?
Review of Economic Studies 75:3, pp. 865-900.
O’Brien, P. K. 2005. Fiscal and Financial Preconditions for the Rise of British Naval
Hegemony, 1485-1815. Working Paper No. 91/05. London School of Economics,
Department of Economic History.
Offer, Avner. 1989. The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Olson, Mançur. 1963. The Economics of the Wartime Shortage: A History of British
Food Supplies in the Napoleonic War and in World Wars I and II. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press.
Poast, Paul. 2006. The Economics of War. New York: McGraw Hill.
Rodrik, Dani. 2007. One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and
Economic Growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Russett, Bruce. 1995. And Yet It Moves. International Security 19:4, pp. 164-175.
Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Linda J. Bilmes. 2008. The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True
Cost of the Iraq Conflict. London and New York: Norton.
Tilly, Charles, 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992. Oxford:
Blackwell.
